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Introduction 
Entire agreement clauses have become a standard ‘boilerplate’ inclusion in most commercial 
contracts. Designed to merge all parts of the parties’ agreement into a single document they are 
intended to avoid the ‘but he said, she said’ type arguments about what the parties’ actually agreed 
and whether terms outside the four corners of the written contract were or were not intended to be 
binding and enforceable. 
Over time the courts have gradually eroded the effectiveness of such clauses – finding, for various 
reasons, that they do not prevent the courts taking into account pre-contractual occurrences 
(statements and behavior) to enforce rights that cannot be found in the words of the written 
document. 
With the introduction of unfair contract terms legislation in both the Australian Consumer Law and 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) that erosion has increased and 
has the potential to increase further. That leaves open the obvious question − are entire agreement 
clauses (any longer) entirely effective?  
Definition  
Entire agreement clauses can take a number of forms so an all-encompassing definition is not really 
possible. However, they all have one thing in common − they all expressly provide that the written 
agreements in which they invariably appear set out everything to which the parties have agreed and 
that anything not expressly included in the written contract forms no part of that agreement.  
In its most common manifestation entire agreement clauses seek to prevent the parties raising 
matters discussed during negotiations (but not included in the final written document) to create 
obligations not detailed in the written contract. 
They may, however, also seek to prevent parties alleging that matters that occurred after the 
formalisation of their agreement in the written document also created new obligations (or varied 
the already agreed obligations). This is important because standard ‘entire agreement’ clauses do 
not preclude post-agreement variations being enforced.  
That effect can, however, be achieved in a number of ways, all of which involve, as a minimum, 
including an express stipulation to the effect that any variation of waiver of the contract will not be 
binding or effective unless it is in writing and signed by the parties. One of the more effective ways is 
to include a formal ‘zip-up’ clause, which normally has two parts − a non-oral modification clause 
(stipulating that the parties have agreed that their written agreement cannot be orally modified) and 
an anti-waiver clause (stipulating that the parties have agreed that the written terms cannot be 
unilaterally varied or waived). An example of such a clause would be ‘The terms of this contract may 
not be varied, amended, modified or waived except by express agreement in writing signed by the 
parties’. 
Care must be taken however, it is quite possible to include a non-oral modification clause in a 
contract and then nullify its effect by proceeding in ways that indicate that one party has waived the 
benefit of that clause. See, for example, Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Variety Steering Ltd [2016] 
EWCA Civ 396, where the court stated that a variation that did not meet the specified requirements 
or a non-oral modification clause could still be enforceable if the plaintiff could show that the parties 
had waived the benefit of that clause by, for example, one party engaging in conduct that amounts 
to a clear representation that it agrees to the variation and the other party then acting on that 
representation.  
Why Include an Entire Agreement Clause? 
In common law jurisprudence, it is a well-established rule that the construction of written 
agreements is a question of law.1 However, as Lord Hoffman noted in Carmichael v National Power 
plc [1999] 4 All ER 897 at 903:2 
‘[the rule that the construction of documents is a question of law] applies in cases in which the 
parties intend all the terms of their contract (apart from any implied by law) to be contained in a 
document or documents. On the other hand, it does not apply when the intention of the parties, 
objectively ascertained, has to be gathered partly from documents but also from oral exchanges 
and conduct. In the latter case, the terms of the contract are a question of fact. And of course the 
question of whether the parties intended a document or documents to be the exclusive record of 
the terms of their agreement is also a question of fact.’ 
Therefore, while ascertaining the meaning of a written contract, once it has been determined that 
the parties’ agreement is completely contained within the four corners of the written document, is a 
question of law, determining whether that contract is in fact all contained within that document is a 
question of fact.  
Consequently, if there is any doubt about whether the parties’ ‘entire agreement’ is in fact 
contained within the confines of the written document the courts are entitled to look to matters 
outside the document − including everything that was said or done during negotiations as well as all 
the circumstances surrounding the agreement.  
That of course leaves open the door to a determination that the agreement was not, in fact, fully 
contained within the written document but was partly written and partly oral, was subject to one or 
more unrecorded but implied terms, was accompanied by some ‘collateral’ agreement which may 
also be enforced − or that it was otherwise affected by something that could either limit or expand 
the parties’ rights. 
The insertion of an ‘entire agreement’ clause is intended to prevent that wider investigation by 
removing any doubt about what the parties intended their agreement to be. It is intended to ensure 
that, in the event of a dispute, the courts are precluded from considering matters outside the four 
corners of the document and that they are restricted to considering the words of the document 
itself when they are determining what the parties’ agreed rights, duties and obligations are.  
                                                            
1 Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd (‘The Nema’) [1982] AC 724 at 736: ‘… in English jurisprudence, as a 
legacy of the system of trial by juries who might not all be literate, the construction of a written agreement, 
even between private parties, became classified as a question of law. The object sought to be achieved in 
construing any commercial contract is to ascertain what were the mutual intentions of the parties as to the 
legal obligations each assumed by the contractual words in which they (or brokers acting on their behalf) 
chose to express them; or, perhaps more accurately, what each would have led the other reasonably to 
assume were the acts that he was promising to do or to refrain from doing by the words in which the promises 
on his part were expressed’. 
2 Carmichael v National Power plc [1999] 4 All ER 897 at 903 (referencing Garwood v Moore (1849) 4 Exch 681; 
154 ER 1388). 
Purpose 
Therefore entire agreement clauses are intended to and to give the parties’ contract a degree of 
finality by merging all aspects of their agreement into a single document which the parties also 
expressly agree supercedes and overrides all prior aspects of their agreement.  
That is, such clauses set out clearly, and once and for all, that the parties’ entire agreement is to be 
found solely within the confines of the written document. Their clear purpose is to obviate and 
remove the necessity of the parties having to demonstrate, in the event of a subsequent dispute, 
that nothing else said or done in the lead up to the contract was intended by them to form part of 
their final bargain.  
That purpose was expressed, perhaps more colourfully, by Lightman J in Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East 
Crown Limited [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 at 614 where he said:  
‘The purpose of an entire agreement clause is to preclude a party to a written agreement from 
threshing through the undergrowth and finding, in the course of negotiations, some (chance) 
remark or statement (often long-forgotten or difficult to recall or explain) upon which to found a 
claim, such as the present, to the existence of a collateral warranty. The entire agreement clause 
obviates the occasion for any such search, and the peril to the contracting parties posed by the 
need that may arise in its absence to conduct such a search’. 
Kirby P applied much the same reasoning in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoors 
Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 177, when discussing the operation of both the parol evidence rule and 
entire agreement clauses, saying that both were intended to prevent the courts having to engage in, 
‘a minute examination of the wilderness of pre-contract conversations’.  
Each therefore recognises that the parties can discuss many things during negotiations but that they 
may not intend everything they discuss to become part of what they ultimately agree. That is, they 
may not intend everything they discuss to become enforceable terms of their eventual contract. 
Indeed, as was submitted in Arnot v Hill-Douglas [2006] NSWSC 429 at [78], the purpose of entire 
agreement clauses is ‘to ensure that commercial litigation does not get bogged down in the 
“wilderness of pre-contractual conversations” and communications, which threaten the stability of 
commercial dealings and the primacy of the written document.’ 
What entire agreement clauses do not do, however, is to act as exclusion clauses. Their intent is not 
to exclude or limit a party’s liability for breaching a term that has in fact been agreed; their intent is 
to deny that the ‘term’ alleged to have been breached was ever an agreed term at all.3 
The Problems 
The problem with entire agreement clauses though is twofold:  
a. to determine what weight the courts will attach to them as assertions of the true nature and 
extent of the parties’ agreement; and 
b. to determine the extent to which they can prevent the courts considering other evidence to 
determine the existence of matters other than the terms of the agreement. 
                                                            
3 Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East Crown Limited [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 and Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson 
CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317 at [40] per Chadwick LJ. 
1 What Weight the Courts Will Attach to Them as Binding Statements of Finality 
A major issue with entire agreement clauses, especially those that have been included as ‘boilerplate 
provisions’ in standard form contracts of adhesion, is that the courts approach them much as they do 
exemption clauses. That is, they accept that if they are in fact expressions of the parties’ true 
agreement they must be enforced − though there is often a degree of reluctance based on some level 
of scepticism about the extent to which they are, in fact, true statements of the parties’ intent.4 
There is also no real consensus about the exact manner in which they should be treated. That was 
made quite clear by Allsop J in Branir v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 where he 
said at [440]: 
Whilst “entire agreement” clauses have sometimes received separate treatment as a genus, 
leading to an approach, as evidenced by the appellants’ submissions here, that there is a rule of 
law related individually to them, it seems to me that they only reflect the epitome of the operation 
of the parol evidence rule. The parties have merely expressly avowed that the totality of the 
contract, about the relevant subject matter, is to be found within the four corners of the document. 
The baseline approach then appears to be that the courts will recognise and apply such provisions as 
they do all other terms of the contract – assuming that they are valid and enforceable expressions of 
the parties’ intent unless there is clear evidence that that is not so – as could be the case if agreement 
was obtained by, for example, misrepresentation, mistake or through duress, undue influence or 
unconscionable conduct.  
Accordingly, it is to be expected (and it is the case) that such clauses will be construed strictly and 
contra proferentem and, like the parol evidence rule, will be applied with a weather-eye to a range of 
now well-recognised exceptions − unless the clauses (and any agreed ‘add-ons’) also expressly address 
(and exclude) them. 
However, there are also a number of other considerations that the courts will take into account in 
making that determination including: 
a. whether the term was expressly agreed or simply included as a ‘boilerplate provision’ in a 
standard form contract. This is because as Lord Bingham noted in Hombourg Houtimport BV 
v Agrosin Private Ltd, The Starsin [2004] 1 AC 715 at [9]-[12] (emphasis added): 
‘9 When construing a commercial document in the ordinary way the task of the court is 
to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the contracting parties. … But there are 
a number of rules, some of very long standing, which give valuable guidance. 
10 First is the rule … “that a business sense will be given to business documents”.5 … 
                                                            
4 Gerard McMeel, ‘Construction of contracts and the role of ‘entire agreement’ clauses’ (2007) 3(1) Capital 
Markets Law Journal 58 at 65. For an example of that approach see Diplock J in Lowe v Lombock Ltd [1960] 1 
All ER 611 at 616: ‘clause 9(ii) is clearly an attempt, which only the size of the print in which it is set out 
prevents one calling blatant, to evade the provisions of section 8(2) and (3) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1938’. 
5 See also Gleeson CJ in International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 
151 at [8] (emphasis added):  
‘In giving a commercial contract a businesslike interpretation, it is necessary to consider the language used 
by the parties, the circumstances addressed by the contract, and the objects which it is intended to secure. 
An appreciation of the commercial purpose of a contract calls for an understanding of the genesis of the 
transaction, the background, and the market. This is a case in which the Court’s general understanding of 
background and purpose is supplemented by specific information as to the genesis of the transaction. The 
Agreement has a history; and that history is part of the context in which the contract takes its meaning’. 
11 Secondly, it is common sense that greater weight should attach to terms which the 
particular contracting parties have chosen to include in the contract than to pre-printed 
terms probably devised to cover very many situations to which the particular contracting 
parties have never addressed their minds.6 … 
12 Thirdly, … [the] court must … construe the whole instrument before it in its factual 
context, and cannot ignore the terms of the contract. But it must seek to give effect to 
the contract as intended, so as not to frustrate the reasonable expectations of 
businessmen. …’7 
b. whether the contract containing it was signed. If it was, it is more likely that the entire 
agreement clause will be upheld. That principle was well illustrated in L’Estrange v F Graucob 
Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394, the case most normally cited as authority for the legal effect of signature. 
The contract that Mrs L’Estrange had signed (albeit without reading it) contained an entire 
agreement clause which read:  
‘This agreement contains all the terms and conditions under which I agree to purchase 
the machine specified above and any express or implied condition, statement of 
warranty, statutory or otherwise not stated herein is hereby excluded’. 
That clause was held to effectively exclude the Sale of Goods Act’s otherwise applicable 
implied condition of fitness for purpose - at least in part because Mrs L’Estrange’s had signed 
the contract containing it without demur. 
c. whether the parties were represented in negotiations. If so, it is more likely that the clause, 
even in a standard form contract, will be upheld, particularly if the parties were also 
experienced business people of equal bargaining power.8 
d. whether the contract is capable of being rescinded because of some defect in its formation as 
would be the case if some vitiating factor affected that formation. If so, neither party will be 
                                                            
6 Citing ‘the classical statement of this rule by Lord Ellenborough in Robertson v French (1803) 4 East 130, 136, 
cited with approval by Lord Halsbury in Glynn v Margetson [1893] AC 351, 358 and by Scrutton LJ in In re an 
Arbitration between L Sutro & Co and Heilbut, Symons & Co [1917] 2 KB 348, 361–362’. 
7 See also Zhu v Treasurer of the State of New South Wales (2004) 218 CLR 530 at [82]: 
It was necessary to construe the [contract] so as to avoid it making commercial nonsense or working 
commercial inconvenience. Its commercial purpose – the purpose of reasonable persons in the position of 
[the parties] – was relevant. That, in turn, required attention to “the genesis of the transaction, the 
background, the context, the market” in which the parties were operating, as known to both parties  
In this context note also Lord Ellenborough’s statement in Robertson v French (1803) 4 East 130, 136, cited 
with approval by Lord Halsbury in Glynn v Margetson [1893] AC 351, 358 and by Scrutton LJ in In re an 
Arbitration between L Sutro & Co and Heilbut, Symons & Co [1917] 2 KB 348, 361–362: 
‘[an instrument] is to be construed according to its sense and meaning as collected in the first place from 
the terms used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their plain, ordinary and popular 
sense unless they have generally in respect to the subject-matter, as by the known usage of trade or the 
like, acquired a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense of the same words, or unless the context 
evidently points out that they must, in the particular instance and in order to effectuate the immediate 
intention of the parties to that contract, be understood in some other special and peculiar sense.  
8 EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan, [1999] All ER (D) 1163 per Chadwick LJ (emphasis added): ‘There are, 
as it seems to me, at least two good reasons why the courts should not refuse to give effect to an 
acknowledgement of non-reliance in a commercial contract between experienced parties of equal bargaining 
power – a fortiori, where those parties have the benefit of professional advice. …’ See also GMAC Commercial 
Credit Development Ltd v Sandu [2004] All ER (D) 589 at [109] and Peart Stevenson Associates Ltd v Holland 
[2008] EWHC 1868 at [39]. 
able to rely on the entire agreement clause because it, together with the rest of the contract, 
will be of no force and effect (a situation which gives rise to an interesting ‘chicken and egg 
argument’ if the entire agreement clause is well-drafted and comprehensive in its coverage; 
if so, it could preclude admission of the evidence required to prove the vitiating element 
which, if proven, would invalidate the entire agreement clause − which leads us to the second 
problem with entire agreement clauses).  
 2 The Extent to Which Entire Agreement Clauses Preclude Evidence of Other Matters 
A properly drafted entire agreement clause may well prevent a contract being held to be partly 
written partly oral, thereby removing the possibility that any ‘oral terms’ will also be enforced. 
Whether it will also prevent evidence being accepted to show, for example, that the agreement 
should be rescinded (or that other relief should be granted), because it was induced by 
misrepresentation or affected by some other vitiating factor, or that some implied term or collateral 
warranty or other pre-contractual ‘promise’ should also be enforced (through an estoppel plea) will 
depend on the courts’ interpretation of the scope of the clause and its willingness to limit it to the 
express terms of the agreement. 
 
The Effect on of Entire Agreement Clauses on Misrepresentation 
As Lightman J noted in Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East Crown Limited [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 at 614 
(EGLR 33):  
‘an entire agreement provision does not preclude a claim in misrepresentation. For the denial of 
contractual force cannot affect the status of a statement as a misrepresentation’.  
That is, while an entire agreement clause may quite validly deny that an earlier non-included 
statement was intended to become (or has become) a term − it does not normally deny that it was 
made, or that it was relied on by the party to whom it was made. 
Therefore, an entire agreement clause, by itself, merely stating that the written document contains 
the parties’ entire agreement, will not prevent the courts from accepting evidence to show that that 
agreement was obtained as the result of misrepresentation and, if warranted, from then permitting 
the victim of the misrepresentation to rescind the contract and escape the obligations it imposes.  
However, as Lightman J also noted in the same case at 614: 
‘The same clause in an agreement may contain both an entire agreement provision and a further 
provision designed to exclude liability, eg for misrepresentation or breach of duty’. 
Such clauses, excluding liability for misrepresentation, are commonly referred to as ‘non-reliance 
clauses’. They expressly stipulate that, in their decision to contract, the parties did not rely on 
anything that was said or done prior to the agreement − thereby effectively denying the key element 
of ‘reliance’ that is required for any misrepresentation plea to succeed. 
Echoing Lightman J’s earlier comments, Young CJ in Eq explained the reason for the inclusion of non-
reliance clauses to augment entire agreement clauses in Arnot v Hill-Douglas [2006] NSWSC 429 at 
[87], saying: ‘There is a distinction between a formed contract and a misrepresentation prior to 
contract. It is quite possible to exclude reliance on representations …’9 
                                                            
9 See also EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan [1999] All ER (D) 1163 per Chadwick LJ: ‘There are, as it seems 
to me, at least two good reasons why the courts should not refuse to give effect to an acknowledgement of 
non-reliance in a commercial contract between experienced parties of equal bargaining power – a fortiori, 
Such clauses could be worded in a range of ways. As in ACCC v Seal-A-Fridge Pty Ltd (2010) 268 ALR 
321; [2010] FCA 525 (see at [48]) they can be something like:  
‘The parties acknowledge that they have not been induced to enter into this agreement in 
reliance on, nor as the result of, any statements, representations, warranties, promises or 
inducements whatsoever, whether written of oral and whether directly related to the contents 
hereof or collateral thereof made by either of them or their officers, directors, employees or 
agents’.  
Alternatively, they may be more economically worded, as was the case in Watford Electronics Ltd v 
Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317 (see at [38]), where the clause read simply: 
‘no statements or representations made by either party have been relied upon by the other in 
agreeing to enter into the contract’. 
If such a clause is included alongside a ‘standard’ ‘entire agreement’ clause it can effectively exclude 
liability for misrepresentation under the general law – because it expressly states that the parties 
have not relied on pre-contractual conduct in their decision to contract. Chadwick LJ described their 
effect in Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317 at [40] (emphasis added):  
‘It is true that an acknowledgement of non-reliance does not purport to prevent a party from 
proving that a representation was made, nor that it was false. What the acknowledgement seeks 
to do is to prevent the person to whom the representation was made from asserting that he 
relied upon it’. 
However, if the parties (or one of them) propose to include a provision, either in the clause 
containing the entire agreement provision or in a quite separate clause excluding liability for 
misrepresentation, that intent must be clearly stated.  
See, for example AXA Sunlife Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1; [2011] EWCA 
Civ 133 where the contract contained an entire agreement clause which provided, in part, that ‘this 
Agreement shall supercede any prior promises, agreements, representations, undertakings or 
implications … relating to the subject matter of this Agreement’. AXA argued that that part of the 
clause excluded liability for misrepresentation. 
The Court rejected that argument, Rix LJ noting at [82] that (emphasis added): 
In these circumstances, I would be inclined, subject to authority, to regard cl 24 as being 
concerned only with matters of agreement, and not with misrepresentation at all. The essence of 
agreement is that it is concerned with matters which the parties have agreed. The essence of 
misrepresentation, however, is that it is not concerned with what the parties have agreed, but 
rather with inaccurate statements (innocently, negligently or fraudulently inaccurate statements) 
which have been made by one party to the other, have been relied on by the representee in 
entering into their agreement, and which may give the representee rights to rescind that 
                                                            
where those parties have the benefit of professional advice. First, it is reasonable to assume that the parties 
desire commercial certainty. They want to order their affairs on the basis that the bargain between them can 
be found within the document which they have signed. They want to avoid the uncertainty of litigation based 
on allegations as to the content of oral discussions at pre-contractual meetings. Second, it is reasonable to 
assume that the price to be paid reflects the commercial risk which each party - or, more usually, the 
purchaser - is willing to accept. The risk is determined, in part at least, by the warranties which the vendor is 
prepared to give. The tighter the warranties, the less the risk and (in principle, at least) the greater the price 
which the vendor will require and which the purchaser will be prepared to pay. It is legitimate, and 
commercially desirable, that both parties should be able to measure the risk, and agree the price, on the basis 
of the warranties which have been given and accepted.’ 
agreement and/or claim tortious or quasi-tortious damages by reason of loss arising out of 
entering into the agreement. In a clause therefore in which three parts are plainly concerned only 
with agreement, including two other parts of the self-same sentence, and in which all the other 
sibling words in the critical part (iii) are words of agreement, and where the critical single word 
‘representations’ (not misrepresentations) is likely in context to refer to representations which 
might be argued, but for the clause, to have become terms of the agreement, and where the 
other important word, ‘supersede’ is essentially a word of agreement rather than exclusion, I 
would thus provisionally conclude that misrepresentation and the exclusion of misrepresentation 
or liability for it are simply not the business of the clause at all. 
Further, even if the clause does explicitly (and effectively) deny reliance on misrepresentations in the 
course of negotiations, if one party does in fact know that the other is relying on a pre-contractual 
representation it is possible that any non-reliance clause will not then be effective (because of 
contractual estoppel).  
It is here that the wording of the clause is critical.  
If the clause states that one party ‘has not relied on any prior representation’ and the other knows 
that in fact it has so relied, the clause may well not have the desired effect of preventing the courts 
from considering and providing remedies for the misrepresentation. This is because of the principle 
articulated by the Court of Appeal in Lowe v Lombank Ltd [1960] 1 All ER 611; [1960] 1 WLR 196 at 
205, that where a false statement is made about a matter of past fact, that statement cannot 
operate either as an estoppel by representation or (where the fact is expressed as an agreement) a 
contractual estoppel, unless:  
(a) there was a clear and unambiguous statement;  
(b) the plaintiff meant it to be acted upon by the defendant, or, at any rate, so conducted himself 
or herself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true and believe that it 
was meant that he should act upon it; and  
(c) the defendant did in fact believe it to be true and was induced by such belief to act upon it.  
As Chadwick LJ later said in Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd at [40]:  
‘That may present insuperable difficulties; not least because it may be impossible for a party who 
has made representations which he intended should be relied upon to satisfy the court that he 
entered into the contract in the belief that a statement by the other party that he had not relied 
upon those representations was true’. 
See also E A Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan [1999] All ER (D) 1163, Peekay Intermark Ltd v 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386; [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep 511, JP 
Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corporation [2008] EWCH 1186 Comm at [537]-[569] 
and Trident Turboprop (Dublin) Ltd v First Flight Couriers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1686 (Comm) at [36]. 
The effect of the principle in Lowe v Lombank Ltd is that, in most cases, the fact that the clause was 
inserted by the proferens for its own benefit means that, irrespective of how clear and unambiguous 
the clause is, it will be almost invariably be difficult for the proferens to assert either that the other 
party, as the nominal maker of the statement, ‘intended it to be taken and relied upon’ or that the 
proferens either ‘believed it to be true’ or ‘in fact relied upon it’.  
However, if the clause simply denies that any representations were made to induce the contract 
(even if that is untrue), that will preclude the court from finding that the contract was induced by 
misrepresentation − and rescission and the allied tortious remedies will not be available. As Aikens J 
said in Trident Turboprop (Dublin) Ltd v First Flight Couriers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1686 (Comm) at [36] 
(emphasis added): 
 Here the parties agree that no representation was made at all. FFCL has agreed with Trident that 
a state of affairs is the case, ie that there were no pre-contract (non-fraudulent) representations 
by Trident. More importantly, the parties agree that this state of affairs is to form the basis of the 
transaction. Even if it was not in fact the case that there had been no representations, the parties 
are free to agree that it was so and base their contractual relations on that state of affairs, for the 
reasons that Moore-Bick LJ sets out in the Peekay case at para 56. 
 
Effect of Entire Agreement Clauses on Pleas of Misleading or Deceptive Conduct 
If the misrepresentation amounts to misleading or deceptive conduct under some statutory 
provision (including but not limited to the Australian Consumer Law) an entire agreement clause, by 
itself, will not exclude liability for that behaviour. The High Court made that clear in Campbell v 
Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 238 CLR 304, Gummow, Heydon, Hayne and Kiefel JJ saying, at 
[130] (emphasis added): 
‘… of itself, neither the inclusion of an entire agreement clause in an agreement nor the inclusion 
of a provision expressly denying reliance upon pre-contractual representations will necessarily 
prevent the provision of misleading information before a contract was made constituting a 
contravention of the prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct by which loss or 
damage was sustained. As pointed out earlier, by reference to the reasons of McHugh J in 
Butcher [referring to Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 592 at [109]], whether 
conduct is misleading or deceptive is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all of the 
relevant circumstances, of which the terms of the contract are but one’. 
However, implicit in that is that the courts will take any entire agreement clause into account when 
determining whether one party was, in fact, induced to enter into the contract because of the 
misleading or deceptive conduct. As French CJ noted in Campbell v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd 
(2009) 238 CLR 304 saying, at [31] (emphasis added): 
Where the impugned conduct comprises allegedly misleading pre-contractual representations, a 
contractual disclaimer of reliance will ordinarily be considered in relation to the question of 
causation. For if a person expressly declares in a contractual document that he or she did not rely 
upon pre-contractual representations, that declaration may, according to the circumstances, be 
evidence of non-reliance and of the want of a causal link between the impugned conduct and the 
loss or damage flowing from entry into the contract. In many cases, such a provision will not be 
taken to evidence a break in the causal link between misleading or deceptive conduct and loss. 
The person making the declaration may nevertheless be found to have been actuated by the 
misrepresentations into entering the contract. The question is not one of law, but of fact.  
See also Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd v Alpine Holdings (2005) 224 ALR 134 at [59]-[60]: 
… In the case of a claim arising out of a contravention of s 52 of the Act [a reference to the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth)] the relevant question, in this context at least, is always one of reliance or 
inducement. If, as a result of misleading conduct, a person is induced to enter into a contract and 
suffers loss, the right to a remedy will subsist whatever the parties may provide in their 
agreement10 … when the agreement to lease was signed by the respondents, they were unaware 
that they had been misled and, as the trial Judge found, they relied upon the appellants' misleading 
conduct in entering into that contract. Consequently, their cause of action is not precluded by 
anything contained within cls 20.1 and 20.2. 
                                                            
10 Citing Clark Equipment Australia Ltd v Covcat Pty Ltd (1987) 71 ALR 367 at 371; Petera Pty Ltd v EAJ Pty Ltd 
(1985) 7 FCR 375 at 378 and Oraka Pty Ltd v Leda Holdings Ltd (1997) ATPR 41-558 at 43,717.  
It therefore seems that an entire agreement clause can be pleaded as evidence that there was, in 
fact, no reliance on any ‘misleading or deceptive’ pre-contractual conduct and that the sole effect of 
having an entire agreement clause, in instances where there is an allegation of misleading or 
deceptive conduct, is to increase the onus of proof on the plaintiff to show reliance. As Einstein J put 
it in Chint Australia Pty Ltd v Cosmoluce Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 635 at [126]: 
In relation to claims under the Trade Practices Act the effect of an ‘entire agreement’ clause is to 
heighten the burden Cosmoluce bears in proving reliance on the relevant misrepresentation: see 
Leda Holdings Pty Limited v Oraka Pty Limited (1998) ATPR ¶ 41-061 at 40,515 – 40-516 (FCAFC), 
Poulet Frais Pty Limited v The Silver Fox Company Pty Limited (2006) 220 ALR 221 at [75] – [81]. 
The wording of such clauses therefore becomes important − as does the manner in which they are 
inserted into the contract. As indicated earlier, if they are simply part of a standard form pre-printed 
contract of adhesion it is less likely that they will be seen to be as French CJ noted in Campbell v 
Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd, an express declaration that the affected party ‘did not rely upon pre-
contractual representations’. 
 
Effect of Entire Agreement Clauses on Implied terms 
As a basic proposition an entire agreement clause will not preclude the courts implying a term unless 
the agreement expressly and clearly excludes its implication. See Hart v MacDonald (1910) 10 CLR 
417 (below); Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353; Eagle v Delta Haze Corporation [2000] VSC 513; Alstrom Ltd 
v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2001] SASC 49 at [125]Insight Oceania Pty Ltd v Philips 
Electronics Australia Ltd [2008] NSWSC 710 at [158], GEC Marconi Systems v BHP Information 
Technology (2003) 128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 50 at [922] and ACCC v Seal-A-Fridge Pty Ltd (2010) 268 
ALR 321; [2010] FCA 525 at [114].11  
As Finn J noted in GEC Marconi Systems v BHP Information Technology (2003) 128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 
50 at [922]: 
 … (i) I consider the law in this country to be that an “entire agreement” clause does not preclude 
implications ad hoc: see Etna v Arif, above; so that I cannot, with respect, agree with the view to 
the contrary expressed in NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2001) 184 
ALR 481 at [387]; and (ii) I find arresting the suggestion that an entire agreement clause is of itself 
sufficient to constitute an “express exclusion” of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
where that implication would otherwise have been made by law. 
Similarly, in ACCC v Seal-A-Fridge Pty Ltd (2010) 268 ALR 321; [2010] FCA 525 the Full Federal Court 
noted at [114]: 
 Just to regard the franchise agreement as including an oral term that the franchisee will pay a 
weekly fee of $50 to Seal-A-Fridge in respect of the 13 number would not though, in my opinion, 
carry fully into effect the intentions of the parties to that agreement. … Thus, the oral term 
providing for a weekly fee of $50 should be regarded as being supplemented by an implied term 
                                                            
11 There is some authority to the contrary; see NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority 
(2001) 184 ALR 481 at [387] – though it seems to be based on an erroneous application of comments in Hope v 
RCA Photophone of Australia Pty Ltd (1937) 59 CLR 348 by Latham CJ at 357-358 and Dixon J at 363; they 
support the proposition that a properly worded clause can exclude the implication of an implied term – not 
that any entire agreement clause will do so. (The decision was reversed on other grounds: see NT Power 
Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90). 
providing for its increase in a way that would give business efficacy to the franchise agreement: BP 
Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 at 292. 
See also Alstrom Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2001] SASC 49 at [125]: 
However, neither this principle [that, whilst the Court should avoid absurdity and inconsistency, it 
should go no further in construing the words used by the parties] nor an “entire contract” clause 
will prevent the implication of terms where that is necessary to give effect to the contract’s true 
intent and purpose. 
However, as was also noted in Alstrom Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2101] SASC 49 at 
[125] if terms are to be implied by the court it can only be on the five principles enunciated by the 
Privy Council in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266, 282-283 
Intrinsic v Extrinsic Implied Terms 
In AXA Sunlife Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd, AXA had argued that the entire agreement clause 
there also excluded the possible implication of terms into the parties’ agreement (ie it argued that 
by specifying that the parties’ entire agreement was contained in the written contract it necessarily 
excluded the inclusion of other terms, not only because they had been raised during negotiations, 
but also because they could be implied on any of the standard tests). The Court held that it did not.  
Stanley Burnton LJ at [41] said (emphasis added): 
None of the orders specifies the basis for the implication of the terms alleged by the defendants. 
It is apparent, however, that the defendants allege that they are to be implied in order to give 
business efficacy to the agreements. In other words, the implied terms are said to be intrinsic to 
the agreements, and true implications. In my judgment, such terms, if otherwise to be implied, 
are not excluded by cl 24. As intrinsic provisions of the agreement, they are within the expression 
‘This Agreement and the Schedules and documents referred to herein’ in the first sentence, and 
they are not ‘prior’ to the agreement, and therefore are unaffected by the second sentence. The 
agreement might have included, but does not include, an express specific exclusion of such 
implied terms. 
Implicit in this reasoning though are two considerations: first, that even if terms may be regarded as 
‘intrinsic’ to the parties’ agreement they can still be excluded by an appropriately worded specific 
exclusion and, second, that implied terms that are not ‘intrinsic’ to the agreement could in fact be 
precluded by a generally applicable entire agreement clause.  
The underlying reasoning (that terms intrinsic to the parties’ agreement will not be excluded by a 
general entire agreement clause) was also applied in Etna v Arif [1999] 2 VR 353 which held that an 
entire agreement clause did not preclude the implication of a term which would otherwise be 
implied. In that case a clause stating that the written contract was the sole repository of the 
agreement’ and that there were ‘no terms … which have been relied upon by the Purchaser in 
entering into this contract other than those included in this contract’ was held not to preclude the 
‘implication of a term which is otherwise to be implied’. 
As with misrepresentation though, if an entire agreement clause is to be effective to exclude the 
application of an implied term, its words must very clearly state that purpose. See, for example, BAE 
Systems Australia v Cubic Defence New Zealand (2011) 285 ALR 596; [2011] FCA 1434.  
In that case the defendants had argued that an entire agreement clause precluded the implication of 
the prevention principle and the duty of co-operation.12 The Court held that it did not because it was 
not worded widely enough. As Bersanko J said at [63]-[65]: 
                                                            
12 The prevention principle was described at [55] et seq as follows: 
 [63] The leading case is Hart v MacDonald (1910) 10 CLR 417 (‘Hart v Macdonald’). That case 
involved a contract for the erection of a dairy plant and butter factory. A term of the contract 
between the parties was as follows: 
 It is to be understood that there is no agreement or understanding between us not 
embodied in this tender and your acceptance thereof. 
[64] The High Court held that the entire agreement clause did not preclude the implication of a 
term of the contract. Griffith CJ said (at 421): 
The application of that rule is not affected by the inclusion in the contract of the 
term I have read, that it is to be understood that there is no agreement or 
understanding not embodied in the tender. A contract to the effect stated in the 
first count of the declaration arises by necessary implication upon a proper 
construction of the express words. 
 Isaacs J said (at 430): 
The agreement contains this provision: ‘It is to be understood that there is no 
agreement or understanding between us not embodied in this tender and your 
acceptance thereof.’ It was urged that this provision excluded implications. But that 
is not so. It excludes what is extraneous to the written contract: but it does not in 
terms exclude implications arising on a fair construction of the agreement itself, and 
in the absence of definite exclusion, an implication is as much a part of a contract as 
any term couched in express words. 
65 I recognise that the terms of clause 1.4 of the Subcontract are different from the terms of the 
clause considered by the High Court in Hart v MacDonald. Nevertheless, assuming for the 
purposes of argument that the prevention principle and the duty of cooperation may be 
excluded by express words of a contract, those words would need to be very clear before a 
court held that that result had been achieved. The words of clause 1.4 are not so clear as to 
achieve that result. It seems to me that clause 1.4 precludes reliance on representations, 
                                                            
[55] In Stirling v Maitland (1864) 5 B & S 840 at 852 Lord Cockburn CJ described what I have referred to as the 
prevention principle in the following terms: 
I look on the law to be that, if a party enters into an arrangement which can only take effect by the 
continuance of a certain existing state of circumstances, there is an implied engagement on his part 
that he shall do nothing of his own motion to put an end to that state of circumstances, under which 
alone the arrangement can be operative. I agree that if the Company had come to an end by some 
independent circumstance, not created by the defendants themselves, it might very well be that 
the covenant would not have the effect contended for; but if it is put an end to by their own 
voluntary act, that is a breach of covenant for which the plaintiff may sue. The transfer of business 
and dissolution of the Company was certainly the act of the Company itself, so that they have by 
their act put an end to the state of things under which alone this covenant would operate. 
[56] The prevention principle has been described as the negatively expressed duty of co-operation: Australis 
Media Holdings Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 104 at 123. 
[58] As to the duty of cooperation, Lord Blackburn said in the leading case of Mackay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 
251 at 263:  
I think I may safely say, as a general rule, that where in a written contract it appears that both parties 
have agreed that something shall be done, which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in 
doing it, the construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary to be done on 
his part for the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express words to that effect. What 
is the part of each must depend on circumstances. 
 
statements, advices or information extraneous to the contract, but not implied terms of the 
nature alleged by the applicant. 
For an example of a clause that was sufficiently clear to exclude the implication of an implied term 
(in that case because of trade custom or usage), see Exxonmobil Sales and Supply Corp v Texaco Ltd 
[2003] EWHC 1964 where the clause provided that the contract ‘contains the entire agreement of 
the parties … and there is no other promise, representation, warranty, usage or course of dealing 
affecting it’. It was held that the clause was effective to exclude a term based on custom or usage to 
the effect that samples taken by an expert to determine whether oil shipped met contract 
specifications would be held for a reasonable time even though there was sufficient evidence of 
such a custom. 
Statutorily Implied Terms 
Also as with the link between misrepresentation and the statutory ‘misleading or deceptive conduct’ 
provisions, an entire agreement clause could not preclude the implication of non-excludable 
statutorily implied terms (such as the consumer guarantees in the Australian Consumer Law) – 
though they could of course, if appropriately worded, exclude implied terms such as those in the 
Sale of Goods Acts where the Act itself permits their express exclusion. See, for example L’Estrange v 
F Graucob Ltd (above). 
 
Effect on of Entire Agreement Clauses on Collateral Warranties 
In Australia, an alleged collateral contract cannot be inconsistent with the terms of the main contract, 
at least where the two agreements are between the same parties. That is, the alleged collateral 
contract cannot vary or contradict the terms of the main contract in any way. Dixon CJ explained the 
relevant principle in Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Co Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 507 at 517 saying: 
A collateral agreement made in consideration of a main agreement cannot effectively subsist 
unless it is consistent with the main agreement. Once an agreement is made in writing it is treated, 
unless the parties are shown otherwise to intend, as the full expression of their obligations. If it is 
established that the writing was intended to contain only part of a fuller agreement it may be 
otherwise. 
That limitation can even extend to situations where the main contract contains an ‘entire agreement’ 
clause because the effect of such clauses is, as Lightman J put it in Inntrepreneur Pub Co (GL) v East 
Crown Ltd [2000] Lloyd's Rep 611 at 613, ‘to denude what would otherwise constitute a collateral 
warranty of legal effect’. That is, if the parties clearly and expressly state that the main contract 
contains their ‘entire agreement’ the courts should not incorporate (or enforce) anything else – either 
as part of that agreement or as part of a separate collateral contract.  
However, if an ‘entire agreement’ clause is to have that effect it must be clear that that is what was 
intended – and that will always depend on what a reasonable person, knowing all of the background 
to the parties' agreement, would believe. See, McMahon v National Foods (2009) 25 VR 251 at [38]-
[41] per Nettle JA (emphasis added): 
[38] But, as was observed by Peden and Carter in an article entitled Entire Agreement – and Similar 
– Clauses,13 because proof of a collateral contract is an exception to the parol evidence rule, 
a merger provision should not be permitted to stand in the way of proof of a collateral contract 
unless the merger provision is clearly expressed to have that effect. I do not consider that 
                                                            
13 (2006) 22 JCL 1, 7. 
clause 33 is sufficiently clearly expressed to have the effect of preventing proof of the 
collateral contract for which the McMahons contended.  
[39] It seems that the view which has been taken in England is that a merger provision should 
generally be treated as applying to agreements which might otherwise operate as collateral 
contracts.14 And at one level, the logic of that approach is appealing. If business persons were 
asked as a matter of principle what is meant by an entire agreement clause, they would 
probably reply that it means what it says. Shorn of surrounding circumstances, the idea that 
an entire agreement clause should not be taken to extend to a collateral contract because the 
latter is a separate contract would possibly be thought of as quaint. But lawyers must beware 
of generalities. In an age of contractual development which puts contextual interpretation 
ahead of formalism, each case is unique. The question in each case is what the merger clause 
in question ‘would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which 
would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the 
time of the contract’.15 And so, as Peden and Carter conclude:  
Ultimately, the resolution of the issue must depend on intention as to the scope of the 
entire agreement clause. Arguably, if the clause refers expressly to collateral contracts 
that should be sufficient statement of intention that a collateral contract may not be put 
forward [as] an additional express term of the bargain. But if there is no express reference 
to collateral contracts, it seems odd to regard a clause in the main agreement as effective 
to prevent enforcement of the collateral contract. At least in cases where the alleged 
collateral contract was contemporaneous with the main contract, it would seem logical 
to infer that the parties intended the collateral contract to operate because otherwise the 
very reason why one party entered into the main contract- the willingness of the other to 
enter into the collateral contract – would count for nothing.16  
[40] I do not overlook that a statement must be promissory in order to amount to a collateral 
contract, and that courts in this country have been reticent about treating pre-contractual 
statements as promissory.17 But as the judge seems to have found, the circumstances here 
tend to imply that the statements were promissory. In my view, too, it is likely that the 
statements were intended to be relied on and were in fact relied on by the McMahons or, to 
put it more accurately, that is the proper conclusion objectively to be discerned.  
[41] It is true, as counsel for the respondent submitted, that allegations of collateral contract 
have often been dismissed on the basis that, if the parties truly intended the alleged 
collateral promise to be binding, they would have set it out in their written agreement. But 
that is not a principle of law. The test is what was said and done and how it would be 
discerned objectively – and the fact is that business people are not infrequently inclined to 
trust other business persons who make promises to them to the point that they do not insist 
upon having those promises reduced to writing. If such situations are to be looked at 
objectively with an informed knowledge of all of the circumstances, the honest and 
                                                            
14 Citing Inntrepeneur Pub Co (GL) v East Crown Ltd [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611, 614; Deepak Fertilisers and 
Petrochemicals Corp v ICI Chemical & Polymers Ltd [1999) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 387; and see Mitchell, Entire 
Agreement Clauses: Contracting Out of Contextualism (2006) 22 JCL 3, 222. 
15 Citing Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 210 CLR 181,188. 
16 (2006) 22 JCL 1, 8. 
17 Citing JJ Savage & Sons Pty Ltd v Blakney (1970) 119 CLR 435, Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd 
(1986) 160 CLR 1; Seddon and Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract, 9th Aust Ed [10.6]; Shepperd v 
Council of Ryde (1952) 85 CLR 1, 13; Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217, 232; Nassif v 
Fahd [2007] NSWCA 269, [28] (Bryson AJA). 
reasonable business person observer may not hesitate to conclude that a deal had been 
done. 
 
Effect of Entire Agreement Clauses on Applications for Rectification 
 If the parties to a contract reach agreement and then draw up a written document which, by mistake, 
fails to record that agreement accurately, the court may rectify the document by ordering that the 
mistaken portion be struck out and replaced with words that do reflect what they actually agreed. 
Rectification is an equitable remedy and it is granted because it would be ‘unconscientious’ to allow 
one party to enforce a written contract that he or she knows does not accurately record their common 
contractual intention. As Campbell JA put it in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 
NSWLR 603 at [444]: 
when a plaintiff succeeds in a claim for rectification, the plaintiff is found to have been justified in 
effect saying to the defendant “you and I both knew, when we entered this contract, what our 
intention was concerning it, and you cannot in conscience now try to enforce the contract in 
accordance with its terms in a way that is inconsistent with our common intention”. 
Consequently, rectification is only available where the mistake is not in the formation of the contract 
but in its reduction to writing. This is because, as James VC noted in Mackenzie v Coulson (1869) LR 8 
Eq 368 at 375: ‘Courts … do not rectify contracts; they may and do rectify instruments purporting to 
have been made in pursuance of the terms of contracts.’ As a result, for example, in Baird v BCE 
Holdings (1996) 40 NSWLR 374, rectification was refused because there was no mistake in the way the 
parties' agreement had been written up; the only mistake was in their misunderstanding of its taxation 
consequences. 
The aim of rectification, therefore, is simply to make the written document an accurate reflection of 
what the parties actually agreed and, for that reason, it can be ordered even where the parties’ 
written agreement contains an ‘entire agreement’ clause: see MacDonald v Shinko Australia Pty Ltd 
(above) at 155 per McPherson J:  
‘Indeed, it may well be impossible for the parties by means of any contractual provision, however 
artfully drawn, to escape the court’s jurisdiction to order rectification in a matter calling for its 
exercise’. 
See also Davies JA at 156:  
‘The purpose of [the entire agreement] clause … is to exclude … evidence either to prove terms 
additional to or different from the written instrument or collateral contracts or to construe the 
instrument in a way different from the meaning to be inferred solely from its terms. But to seek 
the equitable remedy of rectification is not to do any of those things. Equitable relief for common 
mistake, whether by way of rescission or rectification of a written contractual instrument, is 
based on unconscionability; that it would be unconscientious of the party relying on the written 
instrument, to rely on it in the circumstances … And it would generally be unconscientious of the 
party relying on the written instrument of contract to rely on it if it had been executed by the 
parties under the mistaken belief that it recorded the oral contract which they had made or their 
continuing common intention’.  
However, orders for rectification are not given lightly and the normal conditions must be satisfied 
(prior complete agreement or continuing common intention, literal disparity between the document 
and what was agreed, clear evidence of mistake, the proposed rectification must be capable of 
expression in clear, concise terms and there must be no other bar to the order). As the High Court 
noted in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd [33]-[35]; (2005) 218 CLR 471 at [33]-
[35]: 
The parol evidence rule, the limited operation of the defence of non est factum and the 
development of the equitable remedy of rectification, all proceed from the premise that a party 
executing a written agreement is bound by it. … [T]his is not a time to ignore the rules of the 
common law upholding obligations undertaken in written agreements. It is a time to maintain 
those rules. They are not unbending. They allow for exceptions. But the exceptions must be 
proved according to established categories. The obligations of written agreements between 
parties cannot simply be ignored or brushed aside. 
 
Effect of Entire Agreement Clauses on Promissory Estoppel (and Equitable Estoppel generally) 
While there were a number of early authorities to the effect that a plea of promissory estoppel 
could not ‘outflank’ the application of basic contractual rules by preventing a defendant from 
denying the existence and enforceability of some other agreement between the parties18 others 
seem to have favoured the alternative views that McHugh JA expressed in State Rail Authority of 
New South Wales v Heath Outdoors Pty Ltd (1986) 7 NSWLR 170 at 193 where, in dealing with 
equitable estoppel, his Honour forcefully rejected that limitation on doctrines that were based on 
unconsionability.  
His views were followed by Rolfe J in Whittet v State Bank of NSW (1991) 24 NSWLR 146, 151-52, 
and by Higgins J in Liangis Investments Pty Ltd v Daplyn Pty Limited (1994) 117 FLR 28 at [41]-[53]. 
Thomas J in Grace v Peter Harrison Designs & Signs Pty Ltd [1998] QSC 27 did not decide the issue 
but said that he also was inclined to favour McHugh JA’s views. 
 McHugh JA’s general line of reasoning would seem to be more aligned with the treatment of other 
pleas based on unconscionability, such as the availability of rectification to give effect to pre-
contractual communications between the parties (see above) and which resulted in Allsop J (with 
whom Drummond and Mansfield JJ agreed) noting in Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd 
(2001) 117 FCR 424 at [446], after referring to McPherson JA’s order for rectification in MacDonald v 
Shinko Australia Pty Ltd: 
‘it is difficult to see why another remedy of equity based on unconscionability and equally arising 
out of pre-contractual communications should be defeated by a common law rule about the 
                                                            
18 As they were listed in Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [444] they 
included McLelland J judgments in Johnson Matthey v AC Rochester Overseas at 196, and in Bentham v ANZ 
(unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, 26 June 1991); Australian Co-Operative Foods v Norco Co-Operative at 279 
per Bryson J; Skywest Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1995) 126 FLR 61, 102-106 per Miles CJ and Public 
Trustee for the ACT v Megic (1995) 59 FCR 165 at [36] per Miles CJ and New Holland Mining v Weaver Oil and 
Gas Corporation Australia Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of WA, 12 March 1998 per Wheeler J). In addition 
Kirby P, expressly reserved his opinion on the matter, though expressed doubts about allowing estoppel to 
undermine contracts in that way in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Heath Outdoors Pty Ltd (1986) 7 
NSWLR 170 at 172 and 177. In Seabridge Australia Pty Ltd v JLW (1991) 29 FCR 415 at 421 Beaumont J also 
recognised reasons of both principle and policy why courts should not permit the stability of commercial 
relationships and dealings to be threatened by reliance on oral statements and repeated those concerns in 
Cafdawn Pty Limited v Waltons Stores Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 28 March 1991). In Byers v 
Dorotea (1986) 69 ALR 715, 723-25 Pincus J also applied what he saw as the settled law in Queensland to like 
effect. See also Finn ‘Equitable Estoppel’, Essays in Equity (1985) at 94. 
 
construction of documents’ (though his Honour did then go on to note that, given his views about 
the proper construction of the clauses in question, it was ‘unnecessary to decide this question’).  
 It also finds support in a number of other more recent cases including Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash 
Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 603 where Campbell JA said at [554]: 
An ‘entire agreement clause’ might create a factual difficulty in the way of proof of the elements 
of equitable estoppel, most obviously, proof of inducement or reliance, and I would not want to 
rule out the possibility that it might be relevant to any precise remedy granted (though I cannot 
at present think of an example of when that might occur). However, it does not create an 
insuperable obstacle of principle. Consistently with the equitable principle that it will not allow a 
contract to be an instrument of fraud, equity would not permit an entire agreement clause to 
stultify the operation of its doctrines. 
See also Caringbah Investments Pty Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] 
NSWCA 165 at [73]:  
Further, as I indicated above, senior counsel for the appellant did not dispute that pre-contractual 
representations could give rise to an estoppel of the nature of that contended for in the present 
case, nor did he contend that the entire agreement clause necessarily would prevent such an 
estoppel from arising. He was correct in doing so: see Franklins at [33], [554]; Branir Pty Ltd v 
Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; 117 FCR 424 at [444]-[449]. 
 Those views are not, however uniformly accepted. For example, in Chint v Cosmoluce Pty Ltd [2008] 
NSWSC 635 Einstein J noted at [137]-[141] (emphasis added):  
137 Further, the attempt by Cosmoluce to establish an estoppel on the basis of the Resumption 
Representation is excluded by the entire agreement clause 19.10 of the Distribution Agreement.  
 
138 The capacity of an “entire agreement” clause in the nature of clause 19.10 of the 
Distribution Agreement to exclude an estoppel arising from pre-contractual conduct has been the 
subject of a division in the authorities. …  
 141 In my view … the balance of the authorities in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales favours the view that no estoppel based on pre-contractual conduct can be 
established in the light of an “entire agreement” clause of the kind contained in clause 19.10 of the 
Distribution Agreement. 
Given the express statements of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Caringbah Investments Pty 
Ltd v Caringbah Business and Sports Club Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWCA 165 (which did not refer to Chint) 
Einstein J’s views in Chint v Cosmoluce Pty Ltd should now be treated with a great deal of caution. 
However, despite what now appears to be a preponderance of decisions supporting McHugh JA’s 
views, there is no clear universal consensus on the effect of an entire agreement clause on a plea of 
promissory estoppel (or equitable estoppel generally). At the very least though it seems that, as is 
the situation with attempts to escape the effect of such clauses because of misrepresentation, 
implied terms and rectification (among others) it is likely to create problems of ‘proof’ for the party 
raising the plea. As Campbell JA put it in Franklins Pty Ltd v Metcash Trading Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 
603 at [554]: 
An ‘entire agreement clause’ might create a factual difficulty in the way of proof of the elements 
of equitable estoppel, most obviously, proof of inducement or reliance, and I would not want to 
rule out the possibility that it might be relevant to any precise remedy granted (though I cannot 
at present think of an example of when that might occur). However, it does not create an 
insuperable obstacle of principle. Consistently with the equitable principle that it will not allow a 
contract to be an instrument of fraud, equity would not permit an entire agreement clause to 
stultify the operation of its doctrines. 
 
Effect on Entire Agreement Clauses on Interpretation of the Contract 
While an entire agreement clause might effectively preclude a court from enforcing rights, duties 
and obligations that do not appear in the contract but which could be found in earlier documents or 
discussions, it may not necessarily prevent the court, in cases of ambiguity, from using those earlier 
sources to interpret what the parties meant by the words in their final document. Internationally, 
such practices are in fact expressly provided for in UNIDROIT Art 2.2.17 which reads:  
‘[a] contract in writing which contains a clause indicating that the writing completely 
embodies the terms on which the parties have agreed cannot be contradicted or 
supplemented by evidence of prior statements or agreements. However, such statements or 
agreements may be used to interpret the writing’. 
That, however, is subject to the Australian rule regarding the effect of ambiguity, laid down in Codelfa 
Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 352 – in words subsequently 
approved by the High Court in Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council 
(2002) 240 CLR 45 (emphasis added): 
The true rule is that evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in 
the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more 
than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract 
when it has a plain meaning.19 
Should the parties wish to ensure that the courts cannot use prior evidence or statements for that 
purpose they must expressly provide that that is not their intention. A suitable clause could read:  
‘In the interpretation of this contract reference shall not be had to any prior statements or 
agreements between the parties.’ 
 
Effect of Entire Agreement Clauses on Post-contractual Variation and Waiver 
As indicated at the commencement of this paper a proferens can lose the benefit of an entire 
agreement (and/or non-reliance) clause by subsequent statements or conduct indicating that he or 
she has waived the benefit of the entire agreement clause. See, again, Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas 
Variety Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396, Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd and SAM 
Business Systems Ltd v Hedley & Co [2002] EWHC 2733; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 465. 
The same risk attaches if it can be shown that there has been a subsequent variation of the contract 
which may be enforceable in its own right. See, for example, Hotel Aida Opera SARL v Golden Tulip 
Worldwide BV [2004] EWHC 1012 where Michael Harvey QC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High 
Court noted, at [90]-[91]: 
90. However, an entire agreement clause in the terms of Clause 21.1 will not preclude a 
subsequent variation of a concluded agreement. 
                                                            
19 See also Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 86 ALJR 1 at [3]. 
91. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the letter was signed by Mr Lautier before or 
after the formal contract was concluded. If the letter was signed after the contract was 
concluded, and if (contrary to my conclusion in paragraph 85) the letter was intended to have 
contractual effect, it could operate as a variation of the contract. 
 
Unfair Contract Terms Legislation 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to entire agreement clauses though comes from the unfair contracts 
terms legislation. This challenge comes not only from the provisions in the Australian Consumer law 
but also from other state based legislation such as the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).  
Nor is this a phenomenon unique to Australia. Similar issues have been raised in the UK, as 
illustrated by the decision in Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd, a case argued in part on 
the effect of s 11 of the Unfair Contracts Act 1977 (UK) (though, on the facts of that case, the clauses 
in question were not held to be ‘unreasonable’ in terms of that section and, therefore, were not 
void). 
In Australia Part 2-3 of Ch 2 of the Australian Consumer Law (Australian Consumer Law, ss 23 – 28) 
regulates unfair contract terms.20 It applies to unfair terms in both ‘standard form’ consumer contracts 
and, since 12 November 2016, unfair terms in ‘standard form’ small business contracts: s 23(1).  
Standard form contracts are those that are normally imposed by the party in the stronger bargaining 
position on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis with little or no scope for the other party to negotiate terms. 
Such contracts are susceptible to abuse – because they lend themselves to the inclusion of ‘unfair’ 
terms such as exemption, entire agreement and non-reliance clauses that have not been ‘truly’ agreed 
by the parties’. 
The critical considerations are whether the terms are included in a ‘standard form contract’, whether 
that contract is either a ‘consumer contract’ or a ‘small business contract’ and whether the terms are 
themselves ‘unfair’. 
Section 27(2) provides that, in determining whether a contract is a standard form contract, the court 
may take into account such matters as it thinks relevant, but it must take into account: 
(a) whether one of the parties has all or most of the bargaining power relating to the transaction; 
(b) whether the contract was prepared by one party before any discussion relating to the 
transaction occurred between the parties; 
(c) whether another party was, in effect, required either to accept or reject the terms of the 
contract (with three limited exceptions) in the form in which they were presented; 
(d) whether another party was given an effective opportunity to negotiate the terms of the 
contract (other than the three limited exceptions); 
(e) whether the terms of the contract (other than the three limited exceptions) take into account 
the specific characteristics of another party or the particular transaction; and 
                                                            
20 There are equivalent provisions in Div 2 of Pt 2 of subdiv BA of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth) governing unfair contract terms in relation to the provision of financial products 
and services. 
(f) any other matter prescribed by the regulations. 
“Consumer contracts”, for the purposes of the provisions, are contracts for a supply of goods or 
services, or a sale or grant of an interest in land to an individual who acquires the goods, services or 
interest wholly or predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption: see s 23(3). 
“Small business contracts”, for the purposes of the provisions, are contracts for a supply of goods or 
services, or a sale or grant of an interest in land where, at the time of contracting at least one party 
is a business that employs fewer than 20 people and either the upfront price payable under the 
contract does not exceed $300,000 or the contract has a duration of more than 12 months and the 
upfront price does not exceed $1,000,000: s 23(4). 
Under s 24(1) a term will be ‘unfair’ if:  
(a) it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract; and 
(b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who 
would be advantaged by the term; and 
(c) it would cause detriment (whether financial or otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or 
relied on. 
Section 24(2) goes on to provide that in determining whether a term is unfair the court may take into 
account such matters as it thinks relevant, but must take into account both the extent to which the 
term is transparent (that is, expressed in reasonably plain language, legible, presented clearly and 
readily available to any party affected by the term) and the contract as a whole. 
Section 25 then provides a non-exhaustive set of examples of terms which it says ‘may be unfair’. They 
include (inter alia): 
(k) terms that limit, or have the effect of limiting, one party's right to sue another party; 
(l) terms that limit, or have the effect of limiting, the evidence one party can adduce in proceedings 
relating to the contract; 
(m) terms that impose, or have the effect of imposing, the evidential burden on one party in 
proceedings related to the contract. 
If a term in a standard form consumer or small business contract is unfair, s 23(1) provides that it is 
void.21 This need not necessarily terminate the contract as a whole if the unfair term can be severed 
– and this is reflected in s 23(2), which provides that ‘the contract continues to bind the parties if it is 
capable of operating without the unfair term – though the term itself is void ab initio. Such terms are 
therefore also likely to be held to be void in all identical contracts and, in appropriate cases, the courts 
have power to declare them to be void in all such contracts: see ACCC v Chrisco Hampers Australia Ltd 
(2015) 239 FCR 33. 
Clearly in appropriate cases (where an entire agreement or non-reliance clause is included in a 
standard form consumer or small business contract) the unfair contract terms legislation can negate 
                                                            
21 Sections 12GND and 12 BF of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) contain 
equivalent provisions in relation to unfair terms in contracts for the provision of financial products and 
services.  
the effect of those clauses by rendering them void, with the effect that the contract can them be 
enforced without them – opening the door to the admission of other extrinsic evidence. 
In at least one case, action by ASIC has gone even further22 and has convinced the big four banks to 
remove entire agreement clauses from their small business loan contracts on the basis that they were 
unfair and therefore non-compliant with the ASIC Act’s unfair contract terms provisions: see ASIC 
Report 565, Unfair contract terms and small business loans, March 2018. From the point of view of 
those banks the effect is that they will no longer be able to absolve themselves ‘from any contractual 
responsibility for conduct, statements or representations that the lender’s staff may have made to 
small business borrowers about how the contract would operate (eg how the bank would exercise its 
discretions during or on review of the loan)’.23 The Report goes even further and notes under ‘Next 
steps’ that ASIC ‘will also conduct a review of small business loan contracts from other lenders, 
including bank and non-bank lenders to ensure that their small business contracts do not contain 
unfair terms’.24  
The risk that such clauses may negated under the unfair contract terms provisions is therefore very 
real and clauses either have to be rewritten or, better, removed from the scope of the legislation by 
ensuring that the contracts in which they are contained have been independently negotiated and are 
not within what the legislation regards as a standard form contract.  
 Conclusion 
Entire agreement clauses were included in contracts (and were accepted and enforced by the courts) 
to reinforce the parol evidence rule, to provide a level of certainty about the parties’ obligations and 
to prevent unnecessary (and unmeritorious) litigation. Their scope and effectiveness has, however, 
been reduced by decisions that have challenged (and limited) their application in a broad range of 
situations including those involving allegations of misrepresentation, mistake, other vitiating 
elements, implied terms, promissory estoppel and collateral contracts. The introduction of unfair 
contract terms legislation has further eroded their potential effectiveness and has given potential 
plaintiffs an additional ground on which to challenge them. 
                                                            
22 Perhaps surprisingly, the ACCC seems not to have concerned itself with the possibility that entire agreement 
or non-reliance clauses might be a concern. Certainly, the only reference to them in any of its published 
documents is a brief reference in its November 2016 document Unfair terms in small business contracts: A 
review of selected industries, where, under the heading ‘Misleading statements about rights at law’ in the 
section of the report dealing with its review of ‘Independent Contracting’ it notes its concern that such clauses 
‘could mislead a sub-contractor in instances where they may have additional rights at law (for instance based 
on pre-contractual representations made by the larger business). Having said that it then went on to relate the 
one instance where it obtained remedial action, saying: ‘One agreement contained a clause which stated that 
the contract between the business and the subcontractor superseded all previous agreements, undertakings 
and communications, whether written or oral, between the parties. The ACCC considered that this clause 
could represent an incorrect or misleading statement about a subcontractor’s rights at law, and in particular 
may give the false impression that a subcontractor cannot rely on any pre-contractual representations made 
by the business. The business agreed to amend the clause to read that the agreement superseded all previous 
written agreements. Following this amendment, subcontractors are less likely to be misled about their rights, 
including their ability to rely on oral representations made by the business prior to the agreement being 
signed.’ The ACCC seemed satisfied with that modification. 
23 ASIC Report 565, Unfair contract terms and small business loans, March 2018, para [30]. It might be 
expected, following the removal of such clauses from their small business loan contracts that the big four 
banks will also remove them from their consumer contracts. 
24 Ibid Part C ‘Key points’ (though in para 89, under the heading ‘ASIC monitoring and follow-up work’ the 
Report merely says that ‘[ASIC] may also undertake further work to examine small business loan contracts 
from other lenders to ensure that these contracts do not contain unfair terms’). 
So is there any point anymore in including them? The answer is ‘probably, yes’. Entire agreement 
clauses have a distinct and valuable role to play in commercial transactions in reducing the potential 
for disputes and litigation.  
The problem has been, as with many contractual devices which started life with honest intent, that 
they have been abused. However, if the proferens is upfront with his or her customers about the 
existence, extent and effect of any entire agreement (and/or non-reliance) clause at the point of 
contracting and if the customer is prepared to contract on that basis (or to pay a higher price to 
compensate for the additional risk that removing that term may involve for the proferens25) there 
should be no insurmountable objection in principle to the inclusion of such clauses – and no valid 
reason why they, as a species of ‘contractual term’, should be universally regarded as ‘unfair’.  
That also aligns with the High Court’s view that commercial contracts, in particular, are to be 
interpreted in a businesslike fashion taking into account not only the words the parties used but also 
the circumstances in which they reached their agreement and the commercial purpose or objects that 
they intended to achieve: see, generally, Electricity Generation Corp v Woodside Energy Ltd (2014) 251 
CLR 640 at [35] 
If that is not to be the case however, the lawyers will simply have to be more particular in how they 
word and present such clauses. As has been seen throughout this paper the courts have consistently 
found that entire agreement clauses (and/or non-reliance clauses) can effectively preclude parties 
from successfully bringing actions based the alleged presence of misrepresentation, mistake, implied 
terms, or promises given in circumstances sufficient to create an estoppel, provided the clauses are 
worded sufficiently to encompass (and negate) such actions. There is no reason why such clauses 
should not continue to be effective both in contracts generally and even in consumer and small 
business contracts (provided the contracts in which those clause are included are not structured as 
what the legislation defines as a ‘stand form contract’). 
Therefore, are entire agreement clause dead? No – but boilerplate entire agreement clauses probably 
are, at least in consumer and small business contracts. 
                                                            
25 See, again Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001} EWCA Civ 317 at [54]-[56]. 
